Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
New interface
Journal articles

Political stability and trade agreements: Evidence for ‘endgame FTAs’

Abstract : This paper empirically examines the idea that Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) are more likely to be signed by governments playing ‘endgames’; that is, when governments are about to lose power. Two empirical strategies shed light on this hypothesis. One relies on events that increase the probability of political turnover, the other on term limits. I find that countries are more likely to sign FTAs after the unexpected exit of their leaders, when political instability is high. The key finding is partly confirmed in the term-limits strategy as governments are found to form more FTAs during their last term in office.
Complete list of metadata
Contributor : Elisabeth Lhuillier Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Friday, January 27, 2017 - 12:14:40 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, February 8, 2022 - 10:53:45 AM




Lorenzo Rotunno. Political stability and trade agreements: Evidence for ‘endgame FTAs’. European Journal of Political Economy, 2016, 45, pp.133--148. ⟨10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.10.006⟩. ⟨hal-01447843⟩



Record views