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Optimal student loans and graduate tax under moral hazard and adverse selection

Abstract : We thank Kathryn Spier, three anonymous referees of the RAND Journal of Economics, Christian Gollier, and Pierre-André Chiappori for very useful remarks and comments. This manuscript is the revised version of a Working Paper by the same authors, circulated in May 2012 and titled, “Equal Treatment as a Second Best: Student Loans under Asymmetric Information.” This research has been supported by a research grant of the ANR “programme blanc.” Gary-Bobo's research is also supported by Investissements d'Avenir (no. ANR-11-IDEX-0003), Labex Ecodec (no. ANR-11-LABX-0047).
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Submitted on : Monday, February 6, 2017 - 1:50:49 PM
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Robert J. Gary‐bobo, Alain Trannoy. Optimal student loans and graduate tax under moral hazard and adverse selection. RAND Journal of Economics, Wiley, 2015, 46 (3), pp.546--576. ⟨10.1111/1756-2171.12097⟩. ⟨hal-01457311⟩

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