Tax me if you can! Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax Between Competing Governments - Archive ouverte HAL Access content directly
Journal Articles Quarterly Journal of Economics Year : 2014

Tax me if you can! Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax Between Competing Governments

Abstract

We investigate how potential tax-driven migrations modify the Mirrlees income tax schedule when two countries play Nash. The social objective is the maximin and preferences are quasi-linear in consumption. Individuals differ both in skills and migration costs, which are continuously distributed. We derive the optimal marginal income tax rates at the equilibrium, extending the Diamond-Saez formula. We show that the level and the slope of the semi-elasticity of migration (on which we lack empirical evidence) are crucial to derive the shape of optimal marginal income tax. JEL Codes: D82, H21, H87, F22.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
Lehmann, Simula, Trannoy_Tax me if you can!..._2014.pdf (652.03 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origin : Files produced by the author(s)
Loading...

Dates and versions

hal-01474437 , version 1 (02-04-2020)

Identifiers

Cite

Etienne Lehmann, Laurent Simula, Alain Trannoy. Tax me if you can! Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax Between Competing Governments. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2014, 129 (4), pp.1995--2030. ⟨10.1093/qje/qju027⟩. ⟨hal-01474437⟩
934 View
62 Download

Altmetric

Share

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn More