Journal articles
Tax me if you can! Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax Between Competing Governments
Abstract : We investigate how potential tax-driven migrations modify the Mirrlees income tax schedule when two countries play Nash. The social objective is the maximin and preferences are quasi-linear in consumption. Individuals differ both in skills and migration costs, which are continuously distributed. We derive the optimal marginal income tax rates at the equilibrium, extending the Diamond-Saez formula. We show that the level and the slope of the semi-elasticity of migration (on which we lack empirical evidence) are crucial to derive the shape of optimal marginal income tax. JEL Codes: D82, H21, H87, F22.
Keywords :
Economie quantitative
Cited literature [44 references]
https://hal-amu.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01474437
Contributor : Elisabeth Lhuillier Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Thursday, April 2, 2020 - 4:27:16 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, November 4, 2021 - 11:58:07 AM
Contributor : Elisabeth Lhuillier Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Thursday, April 2, 2020 - 4:27:16 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, November 4, 2021 - 11:58:07 AM
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