Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Journal articles

Altruism in Networks

Abstract : We provide the first analysis of altruism in networks. Agents are embedded in a fixed network and care about the well-being of their network neighbors. Depending on incomes, they may provide financial support to their poorer friends. We study the Nash equilibria of the resulting game of transfers. We show that equilibria maximize a concave potential function. We establish existence, uniqueness of equilibrium consumption, and generic uniqueness of equilibrium transfers.We characterize the geometry of the network of transfers and highlight the key role played by transfer intermediaries. We then study comparative statics. A positive income shock to an individual benefits all. For small changes in incomes, agents in a component of the network of transfers act as if they were organized in an income-pooling community. A decrease in income inequality or expansion of the altruism network may increase consumption inequality.
Complete list of metadatas

Cited literature [44 references]  Display  Hide  Download

https://hal-amu.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01590007
Contributor : Elisabeth Lhuillier <>
Submitted on : Friday, October 26, 2018 - 11:36:39 AM
Last modification on : Wednesday, August 5, 2020 - 3:16:51 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Sunday, January 27, 2019 - 1:43:43 PM

File

Bourl-s_et_al-2017-Econometric...
Publication funded by an institution

Licence


Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License

Identifiers

Citation

Renaud Bourlès, Yann Bramoullé, Eduardo Perez-Richet. Altruism in Networks. Econometrica, 2017, 85 (2), pp.675--689. ⟨10.3982/ECTA13533⟩. ⟨hal-01590007⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

254

Files downloads

310