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When do imperfectly competitive firms maximize profits? The lessons from a simple general equilibrium model with shareholders’ voting

Abstract : We consider a general equilibrium model with vertical preferences, where workers and consumers are differentiated, respectively, by their sensitivity to effort and their intensity of preference for quality. We consider a monopoly of which the shares are owned by a fraction of the general population. The price is determined through a vote among all the shareholders. We identify necessary and sufficient conditions for (i) an absolute (relative) majority to vote for the profit maximizing price; (ii) an absolute (relative) majority to vote for a different price. We argue that the more concentrated the ownership the more likely it is that the firm charges the profit-maximizing price.
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https://hal-amu.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01991962
Contributor : Elisabeth Lhuillier <>
Submitted on : Thursday, January 24, 2019 - 10:53:22 AM
Last modification on : Wednesday, August 5, 2020 - 3:17:09 AM

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  • HAL Id : hal-01991962, version 1

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Rim Lahmandi-Ayed, Didier Laussel. When do imperfectly competitive firms maximize profits? The lessons from a simple general equilibrium model with shareholders’ voting. Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, 2018, 78, pp.6-12. ⟨hal-01991962⟩

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