General distribution of consumers in pure Hotelling games

Gaëtan Fournier (1)

1 AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques

A pure Hotelling game is a spatial competition between a finite number of players who simultaneously select a location in order to attract as many consumers as possible. In this paper, we study the case of a general distribution of consumers on a network generated by a metric graph. Because players do not compete on price, the continuum of consumers shop at the closest player’s location. If the number of sellers is large enough, we prove the existence of an approximate equilibrium in pure strategies, and we construct it.

Mots clés: Hotelling games; Location games on networks; Pure equilibria; Approximate Nash equilibria; Large games

Domaines: Economies et finances

Gaëtan Fournier. General distribution of consumers in pure Hotelling games. International Journal of Game Theory, 2019, 48 (1), pp.33-59. ⟨10.1007/s00182-018-0648-4⟩. ⟨hal-01994400⟩