Employment, hours and the welfare effects of intra-firm bargaining

Maarten Dossche (1) , Vivien Lewis (2) , Céline Poilly (3)

1 ECB - European Central Bank
2 Research Centre, Deutsche Bundesbank
3 AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques

Bilateral bargaining between a multiple-worker firm and individual employees leads to overhiring. With a concave production function, the firm can reduce the marginal product by hiring an additional worker, thereby reducing the bargaining wage paid to all existing employees. We show that this externality is amplified when firms can adjust hours per worker as well as employment. Firms keep down workers’ wage demands by reducing the number of hours per worker and the resulting labor disutility. Our finding is particularly relevant for European economies where hours adjustment plays an important role.

Keywords: Overhiring; Employment; Hours; Intrafirm bargaining

Domains: Humanities and Social Sciences; Economics and Finance

Maarten Dossche, Vivien Lewis, Céline Poilly. Employment, hours and the welfare effects of intra-firm bargaining. Journal of Monetary Economics, 2019, 104, pp.67-84. ⟨10.1016/j.jmoneco.2018.09.002⟩. ⟨hal-01995026⟩