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## **Papal Thought on Europe and the European Union in the Twentieth Century**

BLANDINE CHELINI-PONT

'I'm sending out a cry of love to you, old Europe: find yourself again, be yourself, discover your origins, revive your roots, receive these authentic values which make your history glorious and your presence beneficent on other continents.'

John Paul II,  
*European Act*  
at the Cathedral of Santiago de Compostela ,  
Apostolic Travel in Spain,  
9 November 1982

### **Abstract**

*Europe has provided a number of different elaborated objectives in papal thought in the twentieth century. At first, under Benedict XV and Pius XI, European unity was presented as the only means to avoid wars and to tame aggressive nationalisms. With Pius XII, Europe became a vision, founded on a sacred past, where 'Faith' and 'Truth' had been given by Christ (and the Catholic Church) to European peoples. The pope's role was unceasingly to defend federalism, and to condemn communism and Cold War politics. The popes of the 1960s and 1970s recast Catholic doctrine on Europe as a new utopia, colouring Europe with a new concern for the situation of Eastern Europe. They aimed to revive the chance for all European peoples to live in a secure, democratic and developed continent thanks to the protective cultivation of Christian values. John Paul II took the view that a common Christian identity pre-existed de facto and was outside any institutional union. Europe had always lived, as a "spiritual miracle". The christian heritage of Europe has to be listened, transmitted and respected both by individual European states and the Union, at the risk otherwise of the unity project failing and Europe disappearing, falling into decadence and permissive.*

### **Introduction**

Papal thought on the uniting of Europe is of fairly recent date, having been elaborated over less than a century. In its early form, it was closely related to the major objective of twentieth-century papal (C) teaching and pontifical diplomacy, which was aimed at building and preserving peace. At first, it was a practical commitment to finding an 'institutional solution' which would bring to an end the quarrelsome propensities of the old continent. Considering the appalling violence and loss of life of the First World War, Pope Benedict XV (1914-22), who defined it as 'the suicide of civilised Europe', thought of establishing a unified working organisation of the states of (D) Europe, dedicated to preventing a future war. His successor Pius XI (1921-39) was

also favourable to a institutional and diplomatic solution of this sort. However, both of them lacked a positive political vision of a united Europe, being instead preoccupied with the establishment of organisations devoted to the avoidance of war. The task of developing substantive ideas on the subject of European unity fell to Pius XII (1939-58). The Second World War and the death of European fascism encouraged him to create a Catholic vision of Europe which had not existed before. During the pontificate of Pius XII, ideas about Europe's Christian vocation and its 'real' significance began to develop and spread, taking the form of a predominantly federal project of unity and directed towards counteracting the advance of communism (Durand, 2007, pp. 385-91).

The advent of the European Community and the process of integration inaugurated a period of increased commitment in papal speeches, not only regarding the central question of maintaining peace on the old continent, but also European federalism and the construction of Europe itself. In the 1960s and 1970s the papacy added further priorities for maintaining peace, which ceased to be centred exclusively on Europe, although responsibility for the unity of Europe remained 'a duty', according to Paul VI (1963-78). Europe's unity was returned to the heart of Catholic teachings, however, by a new pope who came from the East, John Paul II (1978-2005). In his view, Europe comes to figure as part of Catholic doctrine, going beyond and transcending the geopolitical balance of the continent. John Paul II even spoke of Europe as a cultural and spiritual miracle, albeit surrounded by turmoil (John Paul II, 1982)<sup>1</sup>.

With this pope, the peaceful and steadily growing European community underwent a change of perspective. Previously, the objective of unity was justified by reference to a common Christian identity and was meant to protect the continent from war and further splintering. John Paul II took the view that a common Christian identity pre-existed de facto and was outside any institutional union. Europe had always lived by its Christian culture and values. This culture and these values had to be respected both by individual European states and the Union, at the risk otherwise of the unity project failing and Europe disappearing, falling into decadence and permissive.

## **I. Building a Doctrine in the Service of European Unity**

### **The 1920s: Avoiding the Return of War in a Europe threatened by Rival Nationalisms**

The idea of building European unity through peaceful diplomacy emerged during the pontificate of Benedict XV. In the encyclicals *Ad Beatissimi* in 1914 and *Pacem Dei Munus* in 1920 the papacy promoted 'the politics of peace' from which it has not since departed. In its beginning it was closely focused on the European continent (Vaillancourt, 1990, pp. 49-64). Benedict XV, who replaced Pius X one month after the beginning of the First World War, immediately adopted a neutral position with regard to the conflict and devoted his energy to stopping the war (Renoton Beine, 2004, p. 420; Pollard, 2005, pp.76-78). He was accused by the Allies of favouring the Germans, as he tried to prevent Italy from joining (E) the Allies, while the Germans accused him of supporting the French. In his first world message, *Ubi Primum*, on 8 September 1914, he described the war as 'the bane of God's wrath'. He encouraged the belligerent parties to 'enter into the path of peace and reach out to one another'.<sup>2</sup> In his encyclical *Ad Beatissimi* on 1 November 1914 he spoke out about the horror he

felt over the dreadful war massacres and condemned what he took to be its moral causes, namely, hatred, disdain for authority, class struggle, and greed.

At the Christmas celebrations of the same year Benedict XV proposed a 'truce of God', which was not followed. At the beginning of 1915 he composed a prayer for peace to be recited in all European churches, while on 28 July in *Allorché Fummo Chiamati* he described the war as a 'horrible carnage that dishonours Europe'. In his opinion, victory would serve only to foster hatred and bitterness and prepare for new wars. He intervened by trying to prevent the United States from sending weapons to the powers of the Alliance. He spoke of the entire world becoming a hospital and an open grave, and on 4 March 1916, in *Al Tremendo Conflitto*, he compared the war to the suicide of civilised Europe, imploring the belligerents to renounce their intentions of mutual destruction.

In his famous note addressed to the heads of state on 1st August 1917 (Renoton-Beine, 2004, pp. 397-99)<sup>2</sup>, the pope proposed a negotiated peace plan; however, it was rejected (Renoton-Beine, 2004, pp. 278-96). He spelled out three conditions required to reestablish a durable and equitable peace: a ceasefire; a simultaneous and reciprocal reduction in arms; and the establishment of an arbitration procedure with sanctions for those who opposed its results. He wanted the belligerents to recognise the moral force of law and gradually to demobilise their armed forces. A few weeks later, through his intermediary Cardinal Pietro Gasparri, the secretary of state, Benedict XV suggested the simultaneous and reciprocal abolition of compulsory military service and the creation of an arbitration tribunal; however, these suggestions failed to attract a consensus (Renoton-Beine, 2004, pp. 367-75). At the end of the war he received President Wilson (4 January 1919) in Rome and supported his objectives for building a new international order, intended to help Europe emerge from the disastrous consequences of its long tradition of Realpolitik. In his encyclical *Pacem Dei Munus* on 23 May 1920, Benedict XV deplored the fact that both the Treaty of Versailles, described by him as the 'peace of the victors', and the League of Nations, the first real international organisation, failed to erase the sources of rivalry between states. He even foresaw the possibility of another war as a result of continuing hatred and the absence of a true brotherly society of nations<sup>3</sup>.

Benedict XV's successors were largely inspired by his pronouncements in their teachings, especially by his encyclical *Pacem Dei Munus*, which addressed some of the most significant questions at the time: How to avoid war between Europeans? How to reduce the strength of the rival nationalisms? And how to build peace in Europe?

This picture of Europe, destroyed yet constantly on the brink of conflict, was the backdrop for the development of a 'concrete' conception of peace, no longer focussed on doctrines about the conditions for a just war (Bacot, 1989, p. 250). This active papal diplomacy in favour of building a European order of peace founded on the primacy of law and on moral values remains largely overlooked by historians. The actions and speeches of Benedict XV and Pius XI produced between the two world wars suggest a continuity in the internationalist and European orientation of the Catholic Church.

Pius XI began his pontificate with the encyclical *Ubi Arcano Dei* in 1922. The encyclical's main objective was to prevent the otherwise ineluctable return of the war in Europe, by supporting the creation of an organisation for maintaining peace<sup>4</sup>. Although the Holy See was excluded from the League of Nations at Italy's behest, the pope was represented in the process of its creation by his unofficial

representative, Mgr Bonaventura Cerretti, who was known in France for his diplomatic abilities, having as nuncio negotiated the integration of Catholic dioceses into the framework of the 1905 law on the separation of church and state.

In a comparable way to his predecessor, Pius XI expressed serious reservations concerning the reparations demanded by France from Germany (Note, 1921). He unreservedly supported the English and later the American mitigation of the disastrous economic and financial consequences for Germany of the 'merciless' Treaty of Versailles. His attitude was vigorously denounced in France, by parliament and the media, as an obvious sign of germanophile papal partisanship (Chenaux, 2007, pp. 24-25). Although the Vatican was fairly hostile to the beginning of the League of Nations as first established, the entry of Germany through the Locarno accords (16 October 1925) changed this position. The League became a real object of hope for the Vatican. The Locarno accords were in line with the reconciliation logic of the papacy, and Pius XI's Consistorial Allocution on 20 December 1926 condemned the *Action Française* as a nationalist-Catholic political party hostile to Franco-German reconciliation. With his dismissive caustic reference to 'this immoderate nationalism, this new heresy to be fought', Pius XI reaffirmed his commitment to the strong condemnation of any political ideals that contradicted the laws of brotherhood and of 'the universal human family' (Prevotat, 1996, pp. 359-95; Prevotat, 2001, p. 450). He issued the encyclicals of the 1930s condemning communism and nazism and opened the way for the Holy See to come out in favour of European integration after 1945.

Pius XI was enthusiastic about the signature of the Briand-Kellog Pact which renounced the war.<sup>5</sup> He was strongly in favour of the proposal of French minister and diplomat Aristide Briand, made before the League of Nations in September 1929, to establish a 'federal link' among Europeans.<sup>6</sup> The notion was that if they were bound together by political and economic systems, Europeans would abandon intra-European war. Briand's plan for a European Union had a particular place in the Holy See's European thought. Several copies of the plan were received by the Secretariat, and its points discussed and commented upon by Cardinal Eugenio Pacelli, the Holy See's secretary of state and future Pope Pius XII, and by nuncio Luigi Maglione in Paris. Allusion to this plan was found in the encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno* of 15 May 1931 praising the constitution of regional economic unions (Chenaux, 2007, pp. 24-28). The inspiration of Briand's plan was equally recognised in the pope's remarks to the French ambassador Charles-Roux in July of 1932:

'The present political construction of Europe divided into a number of countries which are ruled by jealous nationalism, does not respond anymore to the conditions of a time when circling this continent can be accomplished in twenty-four hours. The future of Europe lies in a European agreement leading towards the United States of Europe'.  
(Charles-Roux, 1932)

### **The 1930s and the 1940s: Combating Inhuman Totalitarianisms: the Birth of Catholic Doctrine on Europe and Support for Federalism**

In the 1930s the Vatican took the position that the solution for a politically united Europe would be an 'ideological' one. Moving on from the commitment to achieving peace by practical measures of reconciliation, it became urgent to create an ideal to substitute for the quarrelsome totalitarianisms of the continent which were leading

irrevocably in the direction of war. It was an ideal which was nurtured at the same time as the Catholic Church's 'conversion' to democracy and to human rights, a conversion explicitly confirmed during the Second World War by Pius XII, but which was already well under way in the period between the two world wars (Chenaux, 2003, p. 462).

From 1922 to 1939, Pius XI's pontificate was confronted with an unprecedented challenge. The denunciation of totalitarianism was developed by means of reinterpretation of Catholic theology on the two powers, namely, the temporal (political order) and the spiritual (that of the church) which ought to collaborate for the common good. In the encyclical *Iniquis Afflictisque* of 18 November 1926, Pius XI in a 'traditional' rebuke, criticised the interference of the Mexican state in the internal affairs of the Catholic Church. However, with his encyclical *Acerba Animi* of 29 September 1932, on the same subject, he insisted for the first time on going beyond the traditional defence of the 'inalienable rights' of the church and on the freedom of a civil society faced with a state which attempted to restrain it ideologically. The encyclical *Non Abbiamo Bisogno* of 29 June 1931 denounced Italian fascism, the encyclical *Mit Brennender Sorge* of 14 March 1937 denounced nazism as 'racist', and the encyclical *Divini Redemptoris* of 19 March 1937 denounced communism as inhuman and 'atheist'. In these encyclicals taken together, Pius XI presented an entire body of reflection on totalitarianism and a conception of 'a good regime', representing its exact opposite. Totalitarianism was an ideological vision of the world, exclusive and incontestable, imposed in the face of all opposition. This vision required complete control over a society, the disappearance of the separation between state and civil society, the monopolisation of power by the party or the ruler, and the elimination of any opposition and independent organisation.

In Pius XI's opinion, totalitarianism represented a new variant of the historical secular movement born in the sixteenth century, which had already been denounced by Pope Leo XIII in the encyclical *Quod Apostolici Muneris* on socialism (28 December 1878). Totalitarian ideology was presented as directly opposed to the Catholic doctrine of the state founded on the role of intermediary bodies and the principle of subsidiarity (*Quadragesimo Anno*, 15 May 1931). It was in this context of incipiently democratic Vatican political thinking that the Catholic European idea took root.

The idea of European unity has developed through several stages. 'Europe', like 'democracy', did not spring from the Catholic world of ideas and doctrines. In the nineteenth century continental unification projects provoked aversion among many Catholics because of their liberal and nationalistic origins, which were in line with the fight for collective emancipation from church authority (Chenaux, 2007, pp. 24-28).<sup>7</sup> The idea of a 'United States of Europe' and European federalism had a strong anti-Catholic tonality and was overtly Kantian (Castillo, 2001, p. 125). For example, Robert de Traz (1884-51), founder of the (H) *Revue de Genève*, an enlightened and literary review created to support and give new perspectives to the League of Nations' middle, wrote that only the Protestant mind, respectful of the diversity of peoples and men, could respond to the problems of a fragmented Europe, while the Catholics, confusing unity and uniformity, were unable to see the reality of Europe, essentially diverse and plural, in which it was necessary to live together (Meylan, 1969, p. 360).

The idea of a European political union was elaborated inside Catholic thinking circles from already well-developed thematics. The concept derived in part

from a 'political' nostalgia for Christendom which reappeared in pontifical speeches. The notion of Christendom was popular among Catholic authors in the 1930s, being linked with the idea of the 'West' (*Abendland*); it met with unprecedented success in Weimar Germany and the English Catholic Renaissance movement between the Wars (Dawson, 1932, pp. 247-304). Their anti-Protestant and anti-modern reading of European history opposed the golden age of medieval Christendom to the period of its disintegration and decline marked by the birth of the nation-states. This reading remained prevalent in the Catholic culture of the 1930s and (I) still sustained the Catholic imagination in the days following the Second World War.

Pius XII borrowed from this (J) imagination a positive reading of European history, which presented Christian culture as foundational (Mayeur, 1981). He put forward a summary account of 'the extraordinary common heritage', on which he based his first major European encyclical of 1947, *Fulgens Radiatur*, proclaiming St Benedict as the patron saint of Europe. Pius XII's recognition of the spiritual paternity of St Benedict summed up a 'romantic' vision of Europe's origins, which later reappeared in full force with John Paul II. This perception was promoted by a particular romanticism, that of the Germany of Friedrich Novalis, Adam Müller and Friedrich Schlegel, who developed an idealist and overtly nostalgic vision of Christian Europe (Dawson, 1932, pp. 140-167). The vision of a glorious European Christian past was also presented in Pius XII's famous speech of 11 November 1948 at the Convention of the Union of European Federalists in Rome. He invited the (K) 'great European nations with their long histories filled with memories of glory and power to disregard their past greatness in order to fall into line with a higher political and economical unity' (Documents pontificaux, 1948-63, (L) 1948, n° 90, pp.23-24). In this text, the Middle Ages were considered a reference point because 'Europe formed a compact whole and its soul was Christianity'. The modern era was one of a slowly progressing disintegration and growing irreligion, which had driven Europe to misfortune. According to Pius XII, a new era was to be hoped and worked for, an era in which the ties between religion and European civilisation would be reestablished and the rights of God and (M) the divine recognised, or at least those of the natural rights of which human rights were to be considered an integral part.

### **The 1940s and 1950s: Repairing Continental Divisions and Federating Europe's Eastern and Western Blocs**

Pius XII put forward the concept of Europe's 'Christian vocation' and adopted the European federalist programme designed during the Second World War among Catholic intellectuals. Though these ideas were far from being shared by everyone, they provided the main foundation for the new Christian Democratic parties on the continent (Durand, 1995, p. 383). From 1948 until his death, Pius XII continued to manifest sympathy for pro-European unity movements. The support that he lent to governments engaged on this course, under the leadership of (O) Catholic politicians (Konrad Adenauer, Robert Schuman, Alcide De Gasperi), gave rise to controversy around the emergence of a Vatican Europe, which looked to the Americans and adhered to Cold War logic (Chenaux, 1990, p. 364).

Affirming Europe's Christian vocation as well as supporting the federalist project was certainly, from the pope's point of view, the best means of combating communism in Europe. The project had continued to concern the Secretariat of State since the Russian-American alliance of 1941. The Soviet Union aroused fears in the

Vatican well before the beginning of the Cold War. The European unity project made it possible to step out of the Cold War logic imposed by the (P) former Allies and it was not perceived in Vatican circles as (Q) involving a voluntary allegiance to American international politics. The project took on a new aspect in the 1950s with the adoption of the 'reunification' objective accompanied by constant reminders of the existence of 'the other Europe,' with its common Christian faith, as shown by the *Apostolical Letter to Russia* of July 1952. The reminder of the wider dimensions of Europe's heritage created the space for the Holy See's '*Ostpolitik*,' its fight for 'religious freedom'. Seeking an alternative way outside the logic of the Cold War, Pius XII also attempted to break the nuclear escalation by unreservedly condemning atomic weapons, in his encyclical *Mirabile Illud* of December 1950.

Pius XII's European commitment to unity and federation was extremely strong. From the first days after the Second World War he indicated both the necessity and the difficulty of establishing the European Union:

'There's no time to lose. It is about time to happen. Some are even wondering if it is not already too late... We are expecting from the continent's larger nations that they disregard their past greatness and fall in line with a higher political and economic unity' (Pius XII, 1948).

The slow pace of progress after the war did not correspond to papal expectations, as reflected in the address of 13 September 1952 to the pilgrims of the *Pax Christi* movement. Evoking the political personalities who worked for the unification of Europe, Pius XII said:

'When we follow the work of these men of State, we cannot help feeling anxious ...The appropriate atmosphere still does not exist, and without it, these new political institutions will not be able to sustain themselves in the long run' (Documents, 1948-63, (S) 1952, n° 447, pp.95-96).

The Christmas radio message of 1953 also provided Pius XII with the occasion to formulate a new plea. Referring to the apparition of 'a grey vision of a worried Europe', the pope urged Christian politicians into action:

'Why continue to hesitate? The end is clear; the needs of the peoples are before everyone's eyes. To those who ask for an advance guarantee of absolute success, one must answer that it is indeed a risk but adapted to the present possibilities, it is a reasonable one' (Documents, 1948-63, (U) 1953, n° 644, pp. 28-29).

When the first European institutions were established, Pius XII gave a positive reaction. He acknowledged this success with an expression of joy before the representatives of the European Community Steel and Coal industry (ECSC) on 4 November 1957:

'Today many apprehensions have been appeased and we can foresee that the movement which has been created cannot be stopped anymore, that it is necessary to go even deeper and consent to temporary sacrifices without which this would not work... Entering into a larger



community never comes without sacrifices, but it is necessary and urgent to understand their ineluctable yet finally beneficial nature... The results obtained make us feel optimistic about the future'. (Documents, 1948-63, (W) 1957, n° 633, pp. 637-639)

Pius XII felt that the European countries which had acknowledged the principle of delegating a part of their sovereignty to a supranational organisation had (X) 'entered on a salutary path from which a new life in all areas would emerge, a wealth that was not only economical and cultural but also spiritual and religious'.

### **The 1960s and the 1970s: Competing Emergencies**

This period of modern history corresponded to a time of a more 'universal' redeployment of the Catholic Church, a process in which the Second Vatican Council was the landmark. Pope John XXIII (1958-63), returning to the inspirations expressed by Benedict XV, declared the Holy See's support for an institutional Europe which synchronised the European project with his own battle for peace in the face of the nuclear threat. During his brief pontificate, John XXIII introduced some major changes in Vatican policy regarding the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc countries generally, and in his pontifical teachings on peace and disarmament. He saw himself more as a peaceful mediator between East and West than a natural ally of the United States and Western Europe. His main contribution to peace was his encyclical *Pacem in Terris*, pronounced on 11 April 1963, almost two years after his progressive encyclical *Mater et Magistra*, which cleared away various inherited obstacles in the socio-economic and political teachings of the Catholic Church.

On 24 October 1960, John XXIII launched a call for peace, which was published two days later in the Russian newspaper *Pravda*. Several authors noted a sort of reciprocal fondness between John XXIII and Nikita Khrushchev which went back to the mutual exchanges of peace messages in the 1960s. In April 1963, a few weeks after the publication of *Pacem in Terris*, the pope agreed to meet the Adzhubei couple, Khrushchev's son-in-law and daughter, at the Vatican. Furthermore, during the Cuban missile crisis in the autumn of 1962, John XXIII played an important role as mediator between Kennedy and Khrushchev, something which both political leaders recognised (Hehir, 1990, p. 30; Stehle, 1990, p. 306). The diplomatic interventions of John XXIII can be said, then, to have contributed to preventing the outbreak of a nuclear conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Some argue that the Cuban missile crisis convinced John XXIII that *Pacem in Terris* should become the first political priority of the Church (Hanson, 1987, p. 310). Certainly this encyclical remained one of the most important papal documents of the Catholic Church on the subject of peace. It was addressed not only to Christians but to all men of good will and insisted on the rights and fundamental duties of human beings and on the fact that there would not be any real peace without respect for a moral order based on truth, justice, solidarity and freedom. John XXIII linked the question of disarmament to the question of development and demanded an end to the arms race:

'Hence justice, right reason, and the recognition of man's dignity cry out insistently for a cessation to the arms race. The stock-piles of armaments which have been built up in various countries must be reduced all round and simultaneously by the parties concerned. Nuclear weapons must be banned. A general agreement must be reached on a

suitable disarmament program, with an effective system of mutual control (*Pacem in Terris*, § 112)

The Second Vatican Council, which was summoned by John XXIII but which ended under the papacy of his successor Paul VI, also reconsidered the importance of peace and the banning of nuclear arms. Chapter V of the Apostolic Constitution *Gaudium et Spes* (7 December 1965) deals with The Church in Today's World. Peace was not conceived as an absence of war or as a balance game between opposing forces, but was rather the product of justice. John XXIII's interest in the construction of Europe was not as central as that of Pius XII. He nevertheless made a clear statement on this subject in a letter which was read by his secretary of state, Amleto Cicognani, at the 'Social Week' in Strasbourg in July 1962:

'Europe, is a reality which is growing each day. The risk has been taken and this daring has been rewarded.' This document also took note of the first positive results of the European Coal and Steel Community and spoke on the issue: 'Would a European unity once built possess its own common asset, as is the case for each country?' The answer was categorical: 'Without doubt, this European common asset exists; we must affirm it and strive to promote its accomplishment' (Jean XXIII, 1962).

Pope Paul VI explored the question of European unity more regularly and his declarations on the subject were fairly numerous. Thus during his visit to the abbey at Monte Cassino, on 24 October 1964, he proceeded with the solemn proclamation of St Benedict, patron of Europe (*Lettera Apostolica Pacis Nuntius*). Later he justified, before the General Assembly of the European Studies Institutes, the pontifical position on European unity in the following terms, after having evoked the strong involvement of his predecessors :

'Why so much interest on the part of the spiritual community, for temporal questions such as the political and economic organisation of a continent? The answer is already implicitly stated in the brief historical reminder which we have outlined. So many cultural, moral and religious values are involved in the idea of Europe; it represents such a spiritual heritage in the eyes of the Church; the balance of an entire Continent is so important for the entire society to run properly and for world peace, that the Church, concerned for the welfare of mankind, cannot be disinterested'. (Paul VI, 1967)

However, Paul VI's greatest concern lay elsewhere. Very early in his pontificate he was known to be greatly preoccupied with the questions of disarmament and peace. In a logical follow-up to the thinking of John XXIII and the Second Vatican Council, he condemned nuclear and indiscriminate war, as well as the arms race, remaining in favour of a general and controlled effective reduction in arms. In his 1964 Christmas message he proposed the establishment of a global and state-raised development fund for third world countries, which would be supplied by money obtained from disarmament. During a historic visit to the United Nations headquarters in New York in 1965 Paul VI made a plea against war: 'Never again... Drop the weapons from your hands.' In January 1967 he took further actions and established a Pontifical Commission entitled 'Justice and Peace'. A permanent Committee for Peace was constituted within this commission which on several occasions condemned the war in Vietnam.

Beyond disarmament, Paul VI also connected the issue of peace with that of development. The encyclical *Populorum Progressio*, published at the beginning of 1967, established a direct link between development and peace by claiming that 'development is the new word for peace' and that 'peace is radically a work of justice, love and culture'. The encyclical asserted the necessity for a universally competent political authority at an international level:

‘Everyone knows, however, that revolutionary uprisings—except where there is manifest, longstanding tyranny which would do great damage to fundamental personal rights and dangerous harm to the common good of the country—engender new injustices, introduce new inequities and bring new disasters. The evil situation that exists, and it surely is evil, may not be dealt with in such a way that an even worse situation results(...)Who can fail to see the need and importance of thus gradually coming to the establishment of a world authority capable of taking effective action on the juridical and political planes ?’ (*Populorum Progressio*, § 31 and 78 )

## **Europe: an Autonomous Concept under Pope John Paul II**

With Pope John Paul II Europe again became a central topic in papal teaching (Chelini, 1989, p. 208). More than 300 writings and speeches were devoted by him to this topic. John Paul II took two major ideas from Pius XII and elaborated them further: Europe included the East and it was educated in the Christian faith (Chenaux, 2004, p. 280; Durand, 2006, pp. 9-69). A few days before his pontificate, Karol Wojtyła wrote an article in the Catholic Italian review *Vita e Pensiero* regarding the boundaries of Europe (Wojtyla, 1978). (AD) He condemned the ‘western’ vision of Europe, regretting the disappearance of *Mittleuropa* after the end of the Second World War as a spiritual bridge between the two Europes, Eastern and Western, the ‘two spiritual lungs’ of the continent (Chelini, 1989, pp.27-33).<sup>8</sup>

The rediscovery of ‘middle’ Europe, removed from the map by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, was characteristic of the end of the 1970s, particularly in the context of the debate over the installation of Pershing missiles on European soil. As Philippe Portier suggests, (AE) the pope's insistence on directing attention ‘towards the East’ was aimed at remodelling the European map in favour of the Catholic Church (Portier, 2007). Firstly, in terms of the political map, the Polish pope publicly questioned the Yalta decisions which subjected a significant portion of the European continent to irreligious state dictatorship. He expected that, by reminding Christians in Eastern Europe of their common civilisation with those in Western Europe, he would symbolically separate them from the communist regimes. Secondly, in terms of Europe’s religious map, by insisting on the continent’s dual identity, he recognised the full legitimacy of ancient Constantinople as the other centre of power and civilisation (Portier, 2007, pp. 47-48).

This double-edge teaching reached its acme with the proclamation of Ss Cyril and Methodius as co-patron saints of Europe, legitimately ‘sent’ by the Roman pontiff to evangelise the Slavic peoples (encyclicals *Egregiae Virtutis*, 31 December 1980 and *Slavorum Apostoli*, 2 July 1985). By reestablishing Eastern Orthodoxy in its patriarchal primacy, John Paul II assigned himself the task of putting an end to the fractures which had appeared in the Christian community; almost a thousand years before. Similarly, along with the ‘recovery’ of the East, John Paul II sought to reintegrate the nations as natural and unique communities, indispensable to the

integrity of Europe. His thinking on Europe was marked by his Polish education and the romanticism of Polish nationalism. His youthful reading of Adam Mickiewicz (1798-1855), Julius Slowacki (1809-1849) and Zygmunt de Corvin-Krasinski (1812-1859) had convinced him that small nations overshadowed by powerful imperialisms were capable of liberating the continent from the 'sin of power', an expression used by Slowacki in his last poem (AF) King Spirit (*Krol Duch*), an original genesic epopee revealing Poland's legendary past, written in 1847 (Poupard, 1981). Unity protected them from subservience to one federation, itself placed under Christian solidarity. This neo-europeanisation called for the respect of 'the sovereignty of each nation by virtue of its own culture', as he told at The UNESCO (AG) (John-Paul II, 1980) and also allowed it to move away from the centre of the Europe of Brussels: 'The reunited partners', he claimed in his first speech to the members of the European Parliament in April 1979, 'will not forget that they do not constitute all of Europe themselves' (John Paul II, 1979). Europe was not to be confused with or placed entirely at the service of the European community.

### **Europe, 'an Ethico-Judicial Battle'?'<sup>9</sup>**

An important theme present in John Paul II's vision of Europe was that the reconstruction of the continent and of the European Union was dangerously distancing itself from its true nature without any clear consciousness of its own culture. There was a close relationship between the interest of the Holy See since the 1990s and the development of the European Union, which was no longer one of warm support, but rather one of injunction and critical support (Salin, 2005, p. 228). With the process of EU enlargement, what were its main foundations? The notion of its having exclusively liberal foundations was a matter of deep concern for John Paul II. He tried to influence the (AH) foundational principles embedded in the (AI) previous Constitution for Europe. Before the Treaty of Amsterdam was adopted in June 1997, John Paul II and the other European church leaders had, for example, succeeded in excluding legal church-state relations from future European competences. This 'protection' was inserted again in the Treaty of Lisbon, Part I, Title 2, Article 16C, dealing with the national legal status of churches or 'philosophical and non-confessional organisations'. They were to remain within the framework of national sovereignty (Schneider, 2008). This step was significant. In the debates during the elaboration of the European Constitution, the Vatican was in favour of the explicit recognition of 'Europe's Christian roots' and the mention of God in the Preamble to the Treaty (Christians, 2004; Daups, 2006). John Paul II made this cause his own. Despite open support from several EU member states, particularly Italy and Poland, and a myriad of lobby associations, the Preamble retained a different wording about 'the inspiration of the cultural, religious and humanist heritage of Europe, from which the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of human beings developed, as well as freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law'.

The reason for the relative Catholic failure was not only the secular intention of the French government, which was condemned by Cardinal Jean-Marie Lustiger, the French archbishop of Paris, in Berlin, on 28 November 2000. Lustiger claimed that the EU was hanging onto a radicalised vision of Enlightenment culture as the main component of European identity (Chenaux, 1990, p. 203).

(AJ)

However, the omission of references to Christianity and God in the European Constitution were not only the result of the Enlightenment culture, but also a question

of legal consistency. If these references had been included, they might have brought a qualitative transformation in the European and EU member states' law (Monial, 2004). In Philippe Portier's opinion, John Paul II certainly was not nostalgic for the *Res Publica Christiana*. He was not calling for a state which imposed a Christian society. In his address before the European Parliament in October 1988 (John-Paul II, 1988), the pope pointed out his objections to any form of confessional state, recognising the validity of democratic regimes which are founded on the sovereignty of the people and limited government. From this perspective, John Paul II can be seen as having a 'laic' perception of politics which recognised political autonomy and the rule of law. However, he cleaved to the Thomist tradition – strongly present in contemporary Catholic social doctrine – claiming that the rule of law cannot be the unilateral producer of the legal system and the values it protects.

The rule of law is an instrument at the service of societies which precede and extend its authority. It has a transcendent nature and is 'natural' to man as the authority which governs him in the interest of avoiding injustice and chaos.<sup>10</sup> The encyclical *Centesimus annus* (1991) contained the Catholic definition of democratic order:

'The Church values the democratic system inasmuch as it ensures the participation of citizens in making political choices, guarantees to the governed the possibility both of electing and holding accountable those who govern them, and of replacing them through peaceful means when appropriate (§ 46)'.

Democracy must develop respect for civil society. The primacy of civil society over the state is ontological and exists independently of it. Authority is legitimately exercised if it seeks the common good and if it employs legal moral means. Public authority is required to respect the pre-existing fundamental and inalienable rights of each human being (Catechism, para. 2254). If leaders enact laws or take unjust measures – contrary to the 'natural law' – these measures may not force the collective conscience (Catechism, para. 2242). In this case, authority degenerates into oppression.

Two main ideas summarise this conceptual approach. First, the obligations of the rule of law must ensure the conditions for 'household prosperity' (Catechism, para. 2211) and the right means for the accomplishment of the common good. Second, the pre-existence of a civil society and its intermediary bodies. These bodies are able to take charge of, or undertake co-responsibility for, a number of essential and diffused aspects of the same common good (the principle of subsidiarity) (Catechism, para. 1883). Article 3B of the Treaty of Maastricht for the European Union recognised the principle of subsidiarity, which derived from the social doctrine of the Catholic Church, in community legislation under the name of participatory democracy. The Treaty of Lisbon also endorsed the principle of subsidiarity in an additional protocol.

Although the rule of law imposes respect for a base of common values, it does not decide what they are. According to John Paul II, these values do not need any contract. They are not negotiable and cannot be the object of transactions or contractual laws in the name of popular sovereignty. For John Paul II, these values are not to be submitted to the random demands of a section of society, according to a contractual model of liberal adjustments. They should absolutely remain judicially untouchable. In this sense, reminding Europeans of just what Europe fundamentally was and is - meaning a system based on authentic values both revealed and thought

out – would, he believed, help them to encapsulate the inviolability of these values in the common Constitution. If Europeans did not (AK) enter this inviolability in the Constitution under the name of God or revealed Christian rights and duties, the corruption of liberal philosophy would drag them towards an ‘immoral’ individual and collective existence, an immorality henceforth entrenched by law in the name of freedom. John Paul II associated the present Europe and its way of functioning with a deviation into the ‘morbid culture’ and civilisational crisis of liberal societies. Being permissive, indifferent, materialistic, hedonistic, these societies were heading towards ‘the dislocation of large and united families, the disrespect of life from its conception to its end, the absence of moral protection for the youth and the rapid rise of exclusion and poverty’ (John Paul II, 1982; text also available in Salin, 2005, annexe 1, pp. 205-11).

In John Paul II’s opinion, Europe was still disfigured by the confusion of the democratic game with the consensual adaptation of the values in vogue at any moment. Jean Séguy (1980) claims that his European project involved ‘mobilising utopia’. Even if Europe was at peace, prosperous and fairly egalitarian, these values meant nothing if Europeans lost their profound sense of human life. Europe would find its meaningful sense again, only if it returned to the truths of its pre-modern culture and worked towards re-founding the basis of its democratic system. According to Philippe Portier, this call for restoration took an ‘ethico-judicial’ form, by ‘repositioning customs and laws, economical and political systems, the vast domains of culture, civilisation and development back under the guardianship of Christian definitions which have been authenticated by the Roman moral authority’ (Portier, 2007, p. 49). The conciliatory humanism of Europeans should cease to lean on an unlimited liberalism: ‘An ethical system without a transcendent reference system is incapable of creating absolute moral values’, according to John Paul II. ‘It remains fragile in practice and precarious in time.’ This postulate explains John Paul II’s project of resacralising Europe, without which, according to him, Europeans would be incapable of organising a just and viable way of living together.

## **Conclusion**

Europe has provided a number of different elaborated objectives in papal thought in the twentieth century. At first, under Benedict XV and Pius XI, European unity was presented as the only means to avoid wars and to tame aggressive nationalisms. With Pius XII, Europe became a vision, founded on a sacred past, where ‘Faith’ and ‘Truth’ had been given by Christ (and the Catholic Church) to European peoples. The pope’s role was unceasingly to defend federalism, and to condemn communism and Cold War politics. The popes of the 1960s and 1970s recast Catholic doctrine on Europe as a new utopia, replacing Christendom or the Christian Empire. They coloured Europe with a new concern for the situation of Eastern Europe and the necessity of remembering the common belonging of East and West. They aimed to revive the chance for western peoples to live in a secure, democratic and developed continent thanks to the protective cultivation of Christian values.

John Paul II’s contribution to this debate remains without doubt the most personal and original. According to him, European unity represented more than a hope for a lasting peace for its people and for the rest of the world. It had become a possible vehicle of salvation for its inhabitants and humanity. At Santiago de Compostela in 1982, he suggested that Europe was born in pilgrimage and that its maternal language was Christianity. Its aim was not to become richer or more secure.

Its goal was spiritual, and Europe could not reach the best form of society unless it renewed and protected the values which Christianity had encapsulated. Jean Paul II proposed that Europe build toward this ideal of a humane society, diverse, protected, peaceful and prosperous, with a clearly delineated 'political' will, aimed at preserving and promoting inalienable and God-linked values. The legacy of his pontifical teachings continues. His successor, Benedict XVI, has shown his intention of perpetuating and developing Catholic teachings on Europe, in exactly the same way (Ratzinger, 2004; Benedict XVI, 2006).

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<sup>1</sup> John Paul II, in his European Speech at Compostela (1982, para. 3) says: 'I view Europe and see a continent which has most contributed to world development, not only in the field of ideas but also in the fields of work, sciences and the arts. And while I bless the Lord for letting Europe shine its evangelical light since the beginning of apostolic preaching, I cannot keep silent on the state of crisis in which it finds itself at the doorstep of the third millennium of the Christian era

<sup>2</sup> The papal Notes published by Nathalie Renoton-Beine are kept in the Vatican 's Archives, *Archivio della Congregazione delli Affari Ecclesiastici Straordinari di Secretaria di Stato*, period I-III (before 1922).

<sup>3</sup> " For if in most places, peace is in some sort established and treaties signed, the germs of former enmities remain; and you well know, Venerable Brethren, that there can be no stable peace or lasting treaties, though made after long and difficult negotiations and duly signed, unless there be a return of mutual charity to appease hate and banish enmity "*(Pacem Dei Munus)*.

<sup>4</sup> An attempt in this direction has already and is now being made; its results, however, are almost negligible and, especially so, as far as they can be said to affect those major questions which divide seriously and serve to arouse nations one against the other. No merely human institution of today can be as successful in devising a set of international laws which will be in harmony with world conditions as the Middle Ages were in the possession of that true League of Nations, Christianity' (*Ubi Arcano Dei*, para. 45).

<sup>5</sup> *L'Osservatore Romano*, 29 August 1928.

<sup>6</sup> *L'Osservatore Romano*, 7 Septembre 1929.

<sup>7</sup> As observed in Victor Hugo's Speech at the Peace Conference in Paris (21 August 1949), 'My *Revenge is Fraternity*'.

<sup>8</sup> This expression was first used by John Paul II on 25 January 1988 in the *Apostolic letter Euntes in Mundum* for the millennium of the baptism of Kievan Rus'. The original term in Latin is 'duo pulmones', used at part V para.12. The idea of two complementary parts of Europe was nevertheless complete by the time of the article in *Vita e Pensiero*.

<sup>9</sup> Expression used by Philippe Portier, 2007, p. 44.

<sup>10</sup> ' Every human community needs an authority to govern it (Leo XIII, *Immortale Dei*, 1 November 1885; *Diuturnum*, 29 June 1881).. The foundation of such authority lies in human nature. It is necessary for the unity of the state. Its role is to ensure as far as possible the common good of the society' . *Catechism of the Catholic Church* , Part III -Life in Christ, Section I - Man's Vocation Life in the Spirit, Chapter II - The Human Communion, Article 2- Participation in Social Life, a. Authority, para. 1898.