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Quality and price personalization under customer recognition: A dynamic monopoly model with contrasting equilibria

Abstract : We present a model of market hyper-segmentation, where a monopolist acquires within a short time all information about the preferences of consumers who purchase its vertically differentiated products. The firm offers a new price/quality schedule after each commitment period. Lower consumer types may have an incentive to delay their purchases until next period to obtain a better introductory offer. The monopolist counters this incentive by offering higher informational rents. Considering the dynamic game played by the monopolist and its customers, we find that there is always a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) in which the firm immediately sells the good to all customers, offering the Mussa-Rosen static equilibrium schedule to first time customers (and getting full commitment profits). However, if the commitment period between two offers is long enough, there is another MPE with gradual market expansion. Contrary to the Coasian result for a durable-good monopoly, we find that in both equilibria the profit of the monopolist increases (and the aggregate consumers surplus decreases) as the interval of commitment shrinks. The model yields policy implications for regulations on collection and storage of customers information. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Contributor : Elisabeth Lhuillier Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Thursday, July 30, 2020 - 9:09:43 PM
Last modification on : Wednesday, November 3, 2021 - 9:47:22 AM

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Didier Laussel, Ngo Van Long, Joana Resende. Quality and price personalization under customer recognition: A dynamic monopoly model with contrasting equilibria. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, 2020, 114, pp.103869. ⟨10.1016/j.jedc.2020.103869⟩. ⟨hal-02909685⟩



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