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Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Mathematical Economics Année : 2020

Convergence in games with continua of equilibria

Résumé

In game theory, the question of convergence of dynamical systems to the set of Nash equilibria has often been tackled. When the game admits a continuum of Nash equilibria, however, a natural and challenging question is whether convergence to the set of Nash equilibria implies convergence to a Nash equilibrium. In this paper we introduce a technique developed in Bhat and Bernstein (2003) as a useful way to answer this question. We illustrate it with the best-response dynamics in the local public good game played on a network, where continua of Nash equilibria often appear.
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Dates et versions

hal-02964989 , version 1 (10-02-2021)

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Paternité - Pas d'utilisation commerciale - Pas de modification

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Sebastian Bervoets, Mathieu Faure. Convergence in games with continua of equilibria. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2020, 90, pp.25-30. ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.006⟩. ⟨hal-02964989⟩
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