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Dynamic monopoly and consumers profiling accuracy

Abstract : Using a Markov-perfect equilibrium model, we show that the use of customer data to practice intertemporal price discrimination will improve monopoly profit if and only if information precision is higher than a certain threshold level. This U-shaped relationship lends support to a popular view that knowledge is good only if it is sufficiently refined. When information accuracy can only be achieved through costly investment, we find that investing in profiling is profitable only if this allows to reach a high enough level of information precision. Consumers expected surplus being a hump-shaped function of information accuracy, we show that consumers have an incentive to lobby for privacy protection legislation which raises the cost of monopoly's investment in information accuracy. However, this cost should not dissuade firms to collect some information on customers' tastes, as the absence of consumers' profiling is actually detrimental to consumers.
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https://hal-amu.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03665780
Contributor : Elisabeth Lhuillier Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Thursday, May 12, 2022 - 9:47:58 AM
Last modification on : Friday, May 13, 2022 - 3:36:53 AM

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Didier Laussel, Ngo Van Long, Joana Resende. Dynamic monopoly and consumers profiling accuracy. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Wiley, In press, ⟨10.1111/jems.12479⟩. ⟨hal-03665780⟩

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