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Journal Articles Theoretical Economics Year : 2016

Efficient networks in games with local complementarities

Abstract

We address the problem of a planner looking for the efficient network when agents play a network game with local complementarities and links are costly. We show that for general network cost functions, efficient networks belong to the class of Nested-Split Graphs. Next, we refine our results and find that, depending on the specification of the network cost function, complete networks, core-periphery networks, dominant group architectures, quasi-star and quasi-complete networks can be efficient.
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Dates and versions

hal-01446213 , version 1 (05-03-2021)

Licence

Attribution - NonCommercial - CC BY 4.0

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Mohamed Belhaj, Sebastian Bervoets, Frédéric Deroïan. Efficient networks in games with local complementarities. Theoretical Economics, 2016, 11 (1), pp.357--380. ⟨10.3982/TE1742⟩. ⟨hal-01446213⟩
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