Market Games in Successive Oligopolies

Jean J. Gabszewicz , Didier Laussel (1) , Tanguy Van Ypersele , Skerdilajda Zanaj (2, 3)

1 GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille
2 CREA - Center for Research in Economic Analysis
3 CREA - Centre for Research in Economics and Management

In this paper we first introduce an approach relying on market games to examine how successive oligopolies operate between downstream and upstream markets. This approach is then compared with the traditional analysis of oligopolistic interaction in successive markets. The market outcomes resulting from the two approaches are analysed under di¤erent technological regimes, decreasing vs constant returns.

Keywords: Economie quantitative

Domains: Humanities and Social Sciences; Humanities and Social Sciences; Economics and Finance

Jean J. Gabszewicz, Didier Laussel, Tanguy Van Ypersele, Skerdilajda Zanaj. Market Games in Successive Oligopolies. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2013, 15 (3), pp.397-410. ⟨10.1111/jpet.12023⟩. ⟨hal-01499637⟩