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Informal risk-sharing cooperatives: the effect of learning and other-regarding preferences

Abstract : We study the dynamics of risk-sharing cooperatives among heterogeneous agents. Based of their knowledge on their risk exposure and the performance of the cooperatives, agents choose whether or not to remain in the risk-sharing agreement. We highlight the key role of other-regarding preference (altruism and inequality aversion) in stabilizing less segregated (and smaller) cooperatives. Limited knowledge and learning of own risk exposure also contributes to reducing segregation, the two effects (of learning and other-regarding preferences) being complementary. Our findings shed light on the mechanisms behind risk-sharing agreements between agents heterogeneous in their risk exposure.
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https://hal-amu.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02864652
Contributor : Elisabeth Lhuillier <>
Submitted on : Thursday, June 11, 2020 - 11:11:45 AM
Last modification on : Wednesday, October 14, 2020 - 3:50:25 AM

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Victorien Barbet, Renaud Bourlès, Juliette Rouchier. Informal risk-sharing cooperatives: the effect of learning and other-regarding preferences. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer Verlag (Germany), 2020, 30 (2), pp.451-478. ⟨10.1007/s00191-019-00644-9⟩. ⟨hal-02864652⟩

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