Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
New interface
Journal articles

Gouvernance familiale et politique de distribution aux actionnaires

Abstract : This paper studies payout policies of listed family firms. The recent evolutions of family firms models bring to study two types of agency conflicts, the one between shareholders and manager (type I), and the one between majority and minority shareholders (type II). Our results show that payout policies are related to the intensity of the two types of agency conflicts which are overall less strong than in non family firms.
Complete list of metadata

Cited literature [43 references]  Display  Hide  Download
Contributor : Céline du Boys Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Friday, February 17, 2017 - 12:05:05 PM
Last modification on : Wednesday, November 2, 2022 - 9:14:05 PM
Long-term archiving on: : Thursday, May 18, 2017 - 2:21:42 PM


Article du Boys Charlier.pdf
Files produced by the author(s)


Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - ShareAlike 4.0 International License


  • HAL Id : hal-01470330, version 1



Patrice Charlier, Céline Du Boys. Gouvernance familiale et politique de distribution aux actionnaires . Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 2011, 1, pp.1-20. ⟨hal-01470330⟩



Record views


Files downloads